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DEAN JOHN WADE AND THE LAW OF
TORTS
Gary Myers*
Dean John Wade's death last year ends the career of a
great scholar, teacher, and administrator. His many accom-
plishments and his impressive personal traits have been duly
praised and chronicled. His legacy includes an impressive
body of scholarly work, many former students trained in the
ways of the law, and institutions that are better for his walk-
ing their hallways. This article focuses on one particular as-
pect of Dean Wade's contribution-his impact on the law of
torts.
Dean Wade's influence on tort law is extensive and endur-
ing. His importance can be measured in a variety of ways,
both quantitative and qualitative. For example, Dean Wade
had a hand in writing three casebooks, one of which is the
leading text in the field of torts, Cases and Materials on
Torts.' This book has aided hundreds of torts teachers and
almost one million law students' in understanding this funda-
mental field of law. Dean Wade was involved in preparing the
fifth edition some twenty-five years ago, and his involvement
continued until the ninth edition, which was published in
1994. For more than a decade, he worked as Reporter for the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. He wrote approximwi ly thirty-
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five full-length articles and some forty-five shorter piec-
es-many, though not all of them, on the subject of tort law.
He delivered numerous addresses, many of which were pub-
lished. He also assumed the role of an advocate, presenting
his views on torts and attempting to move the law in direc-
tions he perceived as more desirable.
Of course, many law professors ably compile substantial
publication lists during their careers, but Dean Wade and his
work stand out in this crowd of academics and their writings
because of his powerful influence in shaping tort law. His
work was of interest not only to scholars but also to courts,
legislatures, and practicing attorneys. His work dramatically
affected the direction that tort law has taken in the last sever-
al decades.
In reviewing Dean Wade's work, a distinct pattern emerg-
es: Dean Wade was a great compromiser3 who believed in
balancing an array of societal interests in order to arrive at a
just rule of law. He avoided strict categorical rules in tort law
regardless of whether they imposed greater liability on defen-
dants or left plaintiffs with no recovery. He effectively advo-
cated legal rules that took into account the interests of plain-
tiffs, defendants, consumers, and society as a whole. He criti-
cized technical rules and distinctions, particularly those which
confused juries. The tort rules Dean Wade advocated influ-
enced many jurisdictions. This is reflected by the affirmation
of many courts and policy-makers of Wade's tort theories.
One of Dean Wade's greatest contributions to the field of
tort law is the risk-utility test for analyzing design defects in
product liability cases. His path-breaking work on this topic,
entitled On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products and
published in this journal, was a major step in the reformation
of this area of the law.4 This ambitious article, incidentally,
' Robert E. Keeton, Restating Strict Liability and Nuisance, 48 VAND. L. REV.
595, 607 (1995) ("John Wade, distinctively, was the most persistent among the
group in searching for common ground that would enable us to reach recommen-
dations acceptable not only to Bill Prosser as reporter but also, in due course, to
the council and the [American Law] Institute.").
' John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.
[Vol. 65
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may be the most widely-cited article ever published in the
Mississippi Law Journal.5 Professor Michael Green recently
stated that, "While most of the courts and commentators were
attempting to understand and unravel the vagaries of this
new world of liability, Dean Wade published an article about
strict liability that was a tour de force."' This article identi-
fied what have become known as the three familiar categories
of products liability claims: manufacturing defects, design
defects and failure to warn.7
In addition to providing an analytical framework for strict
liability, Dean Wade offered a seven-factor test for determin-
ing whether a product is unreasonably dangerous for purposes
of strict tort liability. Dean Wade introduced the now familiar
factors as follows:
If there is agreement that the determination of whether a
product is unreasonably dangerous, or is not duly safe, in-
volves the necessary application of a standard, it will, like the
determination of negligence or of strict liability for an abnor-
mally dangerous activity, require the consideration and
weighing of a number of factors. I offer here a revised list of
factors which seem to me to be of significance in applying the
standard:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its
utility to the user and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that
it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the inju-
ry.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would
meet the same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe
character of the product without impairing its usefulness or
L.J. 825 (1973).
' Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The ALI
Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REv. 631, 662-63 & n.158 (1995) (discussing
.much cited article" and noting extensive number of references to article in
Shepard's Law Review Citations).
6 Green, supra note 2, at 611.
Wade, supra note 4, at 841-42.
1995]
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making it too expensive to maintain utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of
care in the use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers in-
herent in the product and their avoidability, because of gen-
eral public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product,
or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of
spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or carry-
ing liability insurance.'
Dean Wade's risk-utility test now is the majority rule in design
defect cases.9 Even a cursory sampling of the cases that cite,
discuss, and adopt the analysis include numerous decisions. °
As Professor Marshall Shapo posited, the test "has been quoted
over and over by the courts." The drafters of the Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts also have adopted it. 2 The Supreme
Court of Mississippi joined this growing trend by explicitly
8 Id. at 837-38.
See Shapo, supra note 5, at 666 (stating, "The reporters [for the Restate-
ment] argue forthrightly that 'an overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions
rely on risk-utility balancing in design cases.' (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS § 2 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994))). Shapo disputes the contention
that the risk-utility test has been adopted unequivocally, noting that some of the
decisions "leave considerable room for interpretation." Id. Nonetheless, the risk-
utility test's wide endorsement and discussion, as well as its status as the majori-
ty rule in products liability cases, cannot be doubted.
10 See, e.g., Nowak v. Faberge USA, Inc., 32 F.3d 755, 759 (3d Cir. 1994)
(applying Pennsylvania law); Whitehead v. St. Joe Lead Co., 729 F.2d 238, 244-45
(3d Cir. 1984) (applying New Jersey law); Williams v. Brasea, Inc., 497 F.2d 67,
79 (5th Cir. 1974) (applying maritime law), modified per curiam, 513 F.2d 301
(5th Cir. 1975), and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 906 (1975), and cert. denied sub nom.
Brasea, Inc. v. Bendes Welding & Mach. Co., 423 U.S. 906 (1975); Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 883 (Alaska 1979); Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc.,
709 P.2d 876, 878-80 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc); Duran v. General Motors Corp., 688
P.2d 779, 785 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983), cert. quashed, 685 P.2d 963 (N.M. 1984), and
overruled by Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp. 1995 WL 504785 (N.M. June 28,
1995); Cremeans v. International Harvester Co., 452 N.E.2d 1281, 1284 (Ohio
1983).
" Shapo, supra note 5, at 663.
12 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, § 2 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
See generally Shapo, supra note 5, at 661 (discussing drafters' adoption of risk-
utility test).
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adopting Dean Wade's risk-utility test in Sperry-New Holland
v. Prestage.3
Dean Wade's risk-utility test is not only popular, but wise.
It avoids the rigidity of the consumer expectations test, an
alternative standard which can either inappropriately impose
or bar liability in certain cases. For example, the consumer
expectations test would point toward liability for a highly use-
ful product that presented a low but unavoidable risk of which
consumers were not aware. Under the risk-utility test, howev-
er, the defendant would have a much stronger argument
against liability for such products. Similarly, the consumer
expectations test can preclude liability in cases in which liabili-
ty arguably should be imposed. This often seems to occur as a
result of the "open and obvious hazard" defense, a frequently
applied aspect of the consumer expectations test. This defense
would seem to bar recovery regardless of the ease of avoiding
the danger through redesign or the difficulty of the plaintiff
reducing his or her risk when the product possessed an open
and obvious hazard. For example, a worker who could avoid
injury from an "open and obvious" workplace hazard by seeking
employment elsewhere could be denied damages if the employ-
er asserted this defense and the court accepted it.' 4
Thus, the wisdom of the risk-utility test is that it avoids
arbitrary or undesirable results by taking into account a suffi-
cient number of factors. The test recognizes that all products
present some risks and that some of those risks cannot be
avoided. It recognizes that some products are so useful that no
one could contend that the product should be redesigned or
pulled from the market to avoid the risks involved. On the
other hand, the test imposes liability when the product pres-
ents too great a risk given its utility or the availability of feasi-
ble alternative designs. Thus, the risk-utility test is a prime
3 617 So. 2d 248, 256 (Miss. 1993); see also Satcher v. Honda Motor Co., 52
F.3d 1311, 1313-15 (5th Cir. 1995) (discussing Mississippi's adoption of the risk-
utility test).
" See Shapo, supra note 5, at 681 (citing Micallef v. Mirhle Co., 348 N.E.2d
571, 577 (N.Y. 1976) (rejecting open and obvious hazard defense in case of
workplace injury)).
1995]
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example of Dean Wade's balancing approach in the law of
torts. 5 As Professor Green also observed, Wade's ideas in this
area of law now seem familiar but they were paradigm-shaking
when Dean Wade first discussed them more than twenty years
ago.'6 In one article Dean Wade explains the rationales for the
imposition of strict liability and neatly sums up the principal
arguments:
It is often difficult, or even impossible, to prove negligence on
the part of the manufacturer or supplier. True, res ipsa loqui-
tur often comes to the aid of the injured party. But it is nor-
mally regarded as a form of circumstantial evidence, and this
means that there must be a logical inference of negligence
which is sufficiently strong to let the case go to the jury. This
often is not present, and strict liability eliminates the need of
the proof. A second reason is suggested by the phrase "spread
the risk." The idea is that the loss should not be allowed to
remain with the injured party on whom it fortuitously fell,
but should be transferred to the manufacturer who, by pricing
his product, can spread it among all the consumers. The ex-
tent to which a manufacturer, may be free to "spread the
risk" created by his product can be the subject of some debate.
A different way of expressing essentially the same idea is to
say that the activity of making the particular product should
pay its own way, that the enterprise should bear the liability.
Also similar is the argument regarding availability of insur-
ance. That type of first-party insurance for automobile acci-
dents, which is sometimes called no-fault insurance, is less
available here, since the injured party would need to take out
accident insurance in general; on the other hand, the manu-
facturer can more easily obtain appropriate liability insurance
coverage. Another argument involves the deterrent effect.
Experience seems to demonstrate that if a manufacturer
knows he will be held liable for injuries inflicted by his prod-
uct, that the product will be safer than if he understands that
he can avoid liability by demonstrating the exercise of due
" See Wade, supra note 4, at 835 n.36, 837 n.41 (recognizing that balancing
test was similar in spirit to other multi-factor tests used in tort law, such as
tests for ultrahazardous activity and negligence).
"6 Green, supra note 2, at 613.
[Vol. 65
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care. There is also no good analogy to automobile accidents
here, since a driver who is not deterred by thought of injury
to himself is hardly likely to be deterred by the thought of
financial loss, especially if it would be covered by insur-
ance. 17
Dean Wade persuasively illustrated that strict liability
does not make the seller an insurer of its product:
Strict liability for products is clearly not that of the insurer.
Thus, the manufacturer of a match would be liable for any-
thing burned by a fire started by a match produced by him,
an automobile manufacturer would be liable for all damages
produced by the car, a gun maker would be liable to anyone
shot by the gun, anyone cut by a knife could sue the maker,
and a purchaser of food with high calories would have an
action for his overweight condition and for an ensuing heart
attack."1
He noted the need for limits on both the existence of strict
liability and its scope, as constrained by the concepts of proxi-
mate cause and plaintiffs fault. 9 He attacked the formalisms
and complications of warranty-based notions of strict liabili-
ty.2" He explained why the jury should not be given an in-
struction containing the risk-utility factors he proposed, an
argument worth reading although it may not be entirely per-
suasive."
Another area of tort law in which Dean Wade advocated
balancing tests is the subject of comparative negligence. He
authored the Uniform Comparative Fault Act,22 wrote a num-
ber of articles on comparative negligence, and successfully
7 Wade, supra note 4, at 826.
18 Id. at 828 (footnote omitted).
19 Id.
20 Id. at 834.; see also infra notes 27-30, 32 and accompanying text.
21 Wade, supra note 4, at 838-41.
Unif. Comparative Fault Act §§ 1-11, 12 U.L.A. 43 (West Supp. 1995). Al-
though this uniform act has not been widely adopted, it has been praised. See
Green, supra note 2, at 610 (noting that "model statute . . . contains so much
wisdom that it borders on criminal that more states have not adopted it as their
own" and observing that two states have adopted it).
1995]
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persuaded the Supreme Court of Tennessee to adopt the doc-
trine of comparative negligence, a rejection of many years of
precedent in Dean Wade's adopted home state.23
Dean Wade often criticized the traditional common law
approach in this area: "The common law was long beset by the
all-or-nothing approach that differentiated it from equity. It
would be a step backward, I think, to return to it."24 Under
the common law, if a plaintiff was found to be even partly at
fault, his or her contributory negligence was a complete and
total bar to recovery. Wade preferred the malleable rule of
comparative negligence, which weighs the relative fault of the
plaintiff and the defendant. More particularly, he advocated the
doctrine of pure comparative negligence, which allocates dam-
ages based on the fact-finder's determination of relative fault.
He disliked what he saw as the arbitrariness of modified com-
parative negligence rules, under which plaintiffs recover only if
their percentage of relative fault is less than fifty-one or fifty
percent.25
In addition to dealing with comparative negligence rules,
Dean Wade proposed in the Uniform Comparative Fault Act a
system for joint and several liability and contribution among
tortfeasors. In this Act, Dean Wade grappled with the problem
of the insolvent tortfeasor. Suppose there are two negligent
23 Dean Wade often advocated adoption of the pure comparative negligence
rule, which he sought to persuade Tennessee to adopt. See John W. Wade et. al.,
Comparative Fault in Tennessee Tort Actions: Past, Present and Future, 41 TENN.
L. REV. 423, 459-60 (1974) (advocating adoption of pure comparative negligence in
Tennessee). The Supreme Court of Tennessee eventually adopted this position in
1992. See McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tenn. 1992) (abandoning out-
dated common law doctrine of contributory negligence).
24 John W. Wade, Essays on Torts, 47 LA. L. REv. 691, 695 n.17 (1987); see
also John W. Wade, Comparative Negligence-Its Development in the United States
and its Present Status in Louisiana, 40 LA L. REV. 299, 299-307 (1980) (dis-
cussing development of comparative negligence).
' See John W. Wade, Should Joint and Several Liability of Multiple
Tortfeasors be Abolished?, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 193, 205 (1986) [hereinafter
Joint and Several Liability] (analyzing problems with joint and several liability);
see also Wade, supra note 23, at 459-60 (advocating adoption of pure comparative
negligence in Tennessee); Wade, supra note 4, at 250 (espousing pure comparative
negligence).
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tortfeasors, Ann and Bob. The jury finds that Ann's compara-
tive fault was forty percent, Bob's was also forty percent, and
the plaintiff was twenty percent at fault. Normally, under the
pure comparative negligence rule, the plaintiff would thus
receive eighty percent of the total harm caused, forty percent
from each defendant. But what if Bob is insolvent? Who bears
the loss? Under Dean Wade's proposal, the insolvent
defendant's share is reallocated among the remaining parties
who are at fault, including the plaintiff if the plaintiff was
found partly at fault."' Thus, Ann would pay two-thirds of
Bob's share of the damages, while the plaintiff would bear one-
third of it. In the end, Ann would pay 66.7 percent (forty per-
cent plus twenty-six and two-thirds) of the total damages suf-
fered by the plaintiff. This solution avoids the harsh results
that would occur by either making the other joint tortfeasor
fully liable (which would mean Ann would bear eighty percent
of the loss though she was only forty percent at fault) or mak-
ing the plaintiff bear that loss. Once again, Dean Wade takes
the middle ground, which seems to ameliorate the effects that
absolute rules would have in real-life situations.
Dean Wade's balancing approach is also evident in his
contributions to nuisance law. This point was articulated by
Judge Robert Keeton:
The principal section on nuisance, as it emerged from all
the consultation and debate of the 1970s, reflects a judgment
of the Institute consistent with John Wade's recommendation
for a multi-factor evaluative standard. Perhaps it is a correct
observation also that judicial decisions of the latter half of the
twentieth century have moved farther than had decisions of
earlier vintage toward reliance on evaluative standards in
26 Joint and Several Liability, supra note 25, at 206; see also David R. Smith
& John W. Wade, Fairness: A Comparative Analysis of the Indiana and Uniform
Comparative Fault Acts, 17 IND. L. REV. 969, 973-96 (1984) (discussing balancing
approach of Uniform Act); John W. Wade, On Product 'Design Defects" and Their
Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 551, 577-80 (1980) (discussing proportional alloca-
tion of loss); John W. Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiffs Fault-The Uniform
Comparative Fault Act, 29 MERCER L. REV. 373, 374-91 (1978) (discussing Uni-
form Act).
1995]
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areas where policy arguments founded on highly-valued inter-
ests can be invoked by each set of opposing advocates.27
Other Wade articles apply his balancing approach to tort
rules governing frivolous litigation,28 to the subjects of defa-
mation and privacy law,29 and to a proposed tort for insulting
or abusive language."0 One of his most important articles,
again on the subject of products liability, dealt with the ques-
tion of determining when a manufacturer's knowledge should
be measured-at the time of distribution of the allegedly defec-
tive product or at the time of trial.3' His suggestions for ad-
dressing this difficult issue reflected his balancing approach
which required, for example, that a manufacturer that asserts
its lack of knowledge of information known at the time of trial
had the burden of proving that this fact was not known at the
time it sold the product.2
Dean Wade's writings on tort law display a remarkable
understanding of the field, one drawn from many years of re-
flection. He recognized, for example, that negligence law could
have evolved to deal with many of the situations currently
addressed by strict liability.3
In addition to advocating tort rules and doctrines that
balanced many conflicting interests, Dean Wade criticized tort
rules that were unduly technical and distinctions that were
27 Keeton, supra note 3, at 605 (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS).
28 John W. Wade, On Frivolous Litigation: A Study of Tort Liability and Pro-
cedural Sanctions, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 433, 434 (1986) (suggesting balancing
approach).
' John W. Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV.
1093, 1122 (1962) (suggesting balancing approach to defamation law).
' John W. Wade, Tort Liability For Abusive and Insulting Language, 4 VAND.
L. REV. 63, 115 (1950).
31 John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable
Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 735 (1983).
:2 Id. at 760-61. Dean Wade's version of the risk-utility test generally focuses
on the state of knowledge at the time of distribution, as distinguished from Dean
Keeton's emphasis on the information available at the time of trial. See Page
Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and
Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 569-71 (1969).
3 Wade, supra note 4, at 850.
[Vol. 65
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without a difference. He disliked rules that juries could not
understand. Hence his simplified statement of the strict liabili-
ty rule which reads in pertinent part:
"A [product] is not duly safe if it is so likely to be harmful to
persons [or property] that a reasonable prudent manufacturer
[supplier], who had actual knowledge of its harmful charac-
ters would not place it on the market. It is not necessary to
find that this defendant had knowledge of the harmful char-
acter of the [product] in order to determine that it was not
duly safe."34
Hence his proposal that the overlapping claims of negligence,
warranty, and strict liability be melded into one. 5 Hence his
dislike for some of the arcane distinctions between libel and
slander, including the "special damages" rule.3
One of the few areas in which Dean Wade seemed to abdi-
cate his centrist role was in the area of tort reform. He had few
positive words on the topic, referring to the proposals as "spe-
cial-interest legislation" resulting from "an intensive, lavishly
financed campaign to persuade the legislatures and the general
public."37 He believed that tort reform measures were "primar-
ily for the benefit of insurance companies."" Interestingly, al-
though he sometimes favored the concept of uniformity of state
laws in the area of products liability,39 he disavowed it when
tort reform became a possibility on the federal level.4 ° Al-
See id. at 839-40.
5 Id. at 849-50; see also John W. Wade, Tort Liability for Products Causing
Physical Injury and Article 2 of the U.C.C., 48 MO. L. REV. 1, 27 (1983) [herein-
after Tort Liability].
' John W. Wade, The Communicative Torts and the First Amendment, 48
MIss. L.J. 671, 711 (1977).
31 Joint and Several Liability, supra note 25, at 207; see John W. Wade, Strict
Product Liability: A Look at Its Evolution, 19 THE BRIEF 8, 56 (1989) (asserting
that reform provisions sought to change both statutory and common law).
Wade, supra note 26, at 209.
" John W. Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33
VAND. L. REV. 551, 576 (1980); see also Tort Liability, supra note 35, at 27-28
(suggesting that greater simplicity of law could be beneficial).
'o See generally John W. Wade, An Evaluation of the "Insurance Crisis" and
Existing Tort Law, 24 HOUS. L. REV. 81 (1987) (suggesting that substantive provi-
1995]
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though his arguments in this area may not be as convincing as
his position on other issues, his expertise in this field has pro-
vided valuable insight. For example, Dean Wade produced
compelling evidence rebutting the mythical "litigation explo-
sion" believed to be taking place in American courts today."'
As this survey of Dean Wade's contributions to tort law
indicates, his influence in the field has been powerful. Dean
Wade's pragmatic approach has held the day on many hotly-
contested tort issues. Roger Traynor made a noteworthy com-
ment to Wade shortly after the 1963 decision in Greenman v.
Yuba Products Co.,42 a case in which California adopted strict
liability. "Judge Traynor confided in me that he expected strict
liability for products to simplify trials so much that there
would be no reason to write further in the field of torts. He
advised me to write on the subject of restitution instead.""
Fortunately, although Dean Wade heeded the call to write
on restitution, he also ignored Traynor's guidance on the sub-
ject of torts.
sions of proposed federal tort laws have become far too detailed and have favored
defendants).
" Wade, supra note 40, at 95-96.
42 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
41 Wade, supra note 40, at 83.
[Vol. 65
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